Ebola, Monkeypox and Coronavirus Update: 06 Oct 2022
Coronavirus ArchiveEbola
–Yep, Ebola is back. After we went to “press” with the last update, a sample from a 24 year old citizen of Uganda (which sits on the eastern border of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) who presented with symptoms on 11 September was finally tested. Unfortunately, this was after he had visited at least two clinics over 5 days, and diagnostic sample did not complete confirmatory testing until the day he died, 9 days after symptom onset. While they are calling him the index case, he might not be, as they have retrospectively tested a cluster of unusual deaths with similar symptoms from early and mid September in three neighboring regions within Uganda. The most recent information I can find puts the current outbreak at 63 confirmed or suspected cases, with 29 deaths. This includes 10 healthcare workers with 4 deaths among doctors and nurses already. There is undoubtedly already active community spread, which likely has been going on for at least 2-3 weeks. Contract tracing has started, but is way behind at this point. That head start for the virus is not ideal, and the WHO is convening a meeting of Uganda and neighboring countries to discuss control measures for the outbreak.
Under the radar, but the US is now diverting travelers from Uganda to 5 designated airports for Ebola testing at time of entry to the US. The statement to Bloomberg news today cited an abundance of caution, and a belief that risk of the spread of Ebola to the US was low. However, administration officials believe the current case count represents a “significant” undercount.
I, too, believe the current count of 63 confirmed and probable is low given the sharp jump and epidemiology reports from WHO thus far.
The challenge for this outbreak is first and foremost, the virus has a significant head start. Maybe not quite as bad as the West Africa outbreak of 2014, but a MUCH larger head start than the last few pop ups in the DRC. The other problem is the strain of Ebola virus involved. Most outbreaks, including the current one, that hit Uganda are Ebola Sudan. The West Africa and the recent DRC outbreaks have all been Ebola Zaire (or Marburg). The vaccine we have for Ebola protects against Zaire. It does not, based on laboratory testing, protect against Ebola Sudan. So the ring vaccination strategy that has helped nip DRC outbreaks in the bud relatively swiftly cannot be managed here, at least not with existing and approved Ebola Zaire vaccines. Some of the acute treatment drugs are also of uncertain efficacy against Ebola Sudan. On the plus side, Ebola Sudan is not -quite- as lethal as Ebola Zaire. On the down side, “not quite as lethal” on average is still a mortality rate of 50-60% for Sudan.
And again, despite fairly brisk spread in Uganda so far for Ebola, Ebola is wayyyyy harder to catch than coronavirus, generally requiring close contact and exposure to infected body fluids like blood.
There are 6 experimental vaccines for Ebola Sudan ready for testing, though. There just has not been an outbreak of Sudan to formally test them in a clinical trial. They will need to get approval from the Ugandan health authorities, but I doubt that takes long.
This will be a developing story, and one that we will follow.
Monkeypox
–Cases continue to dwindle away. Again, there does remain a risk of re-ignition, but as the fall hits and travel season slows a bit, this seems more likely to finish as an epidemic, without converting to truly endemic disease.
Coronavirus
–There is a little bit of activity in Germany, Austria and some neighboring countries. Otherwise, cases are mostly quiet. In the US, cases continue a months long decline, and as of the end of last month, up to about 30 states are no longer reporting positivity or positive cases as much or at all to where the usual databases (Johns Hopkins) can track them. Yes, I know there have been some weak sauce attempts at the next dangerous variant to emerge headlines in the past couple weeks. Look at what regional and national governments are doing and not what they are saying.
Speaking of which, China enters another congress of the CCP. While we still have high hopes for a well timed and placed meteor, there was some kerfluffle about photos of the CCP big wigs gathered without masks. This has raised speculation that the CCP will somehow, someway try to walk back its “Zero COVID” policy in favor of keeping their economy stable. The unemployment rate for young folks in their 20s in China right now is shocking and unsustainable, and Zero COVID policies have rightly taken a lot of blame for that. However, there is -definite- economic weakness as inflation, particularly in needed fuel and food, erodes the world’s disposable income. On top of that, supply lines continue to quietly shift to more on shoring as part of “lessons learned” from the pandemic response. For example, there is $100 billion being pumped into Rochester, NY for what will be a massive computer chip producing plant. Yes, labor costs will be higher in the US–but North America is blessed with relatively stable regimes, the largest internal connecting waterway system in the world, stable and productive agricultural zones, and can produce its own energy (in fact, is still exporting said energy). Couple that with demographics that doom China to population contraction over the next several decades, and I would there is gradual recognition both of what China actually is and what it will be over the next several decades. But we’ll leave more of that for the “socioeconomics” section.
–CDC no longer recommends universal masking in health facilities. “Updates were made to reflect the high levels of vaccine and infection induced immunity and the availability of effective treatments and prevention tools,” per the CDC.
Yes, Hypothetical Reader, this is tacit admission of arguments this update has made about the published evidence behind infection induced immunity AND that the real pandemic risk was risk of hospitalization. A risk which was heavily mitigated by the availability of effective treatments and vaccines.
–In other quiet health news, per local reports, Sweden is no longer recommending that children age 12 to 17 get the COVID vaccine, citing the low risk of severe COVID in this age group. Starting November 1, only kids in this age group with high risk comorbidities will be eligible for the vaccine. I’m not sure how many kids have been vaccinated in Sweden so far. Also worth mentioning that Sweden was one of the countries at the beginning of the year that did NOT recommend or approve the vaccine for kids under age 12, again citing low risks to that age group in the absence of known high risk factors. Also worth mentioning that MOST of Scandavia and Germany passed on vaccines for the 5 through 11 group, for similar reasons.
That said, Sweden is recommending a fourth booster for those over 65.
Denmark has lifted all COVID restrictions and is not recommending a booster (4th dose). Their health ministry believes they are at herd immunity and even those 85 and over and nursing home residents are “well protected” by the level of antibodies they have been measuring in their population.
Yes, I’m going to stop you right there, Hypothetical Reader. That is intelligent, reasoned use of antibody levels to guide vaccination decisions, something this update has encouraged for months now.
Hope… springs. If Denmark can do it, surely, surely others can too…
For comparison sake, reporting I can find suggests a primary immunization rate of 80% for Denmark, with ~60% with at least one booster on board.
Those under 18 in Denmark are no longer recommended for a third dose booster, again for similar risk/benefit and herd immunity reasons. Denmark is also planning to wrap vaccination up in the spring (barring any major changes, I suppose).
–So just to highlight the variety of approaches around the world towards vaccination, particularly in groups where the risk/benefit is a little murkier. It’s not just me saying that risk/benefit is really tough in some groups! : ) And why for some of those decisions, I’ll understand, and won’t eat your lunch either way. Where you come down on risk you are willing to take for yourself or family members, versus benefits, is a very personal thing, and changes a bit.
For those with risk factors for severe COVID though, strongly recommend discussing boosters with your doctor. Also worth discussing need for and risk/benefit of boosters if you have already had documented COVID, particularly during an Omicron wave. And no, “I’m pretty sure I had it” doesn’t count. Positive rapid test or even better, PCR test, for COVID is “documented COVID.”
–WHILE WE ARE TALKING VACCINES THOUGH… had a colleague in the UK get absolutely wiped by the bona fide flu this past week, along with nearly everyone he was hanging out with. They had not yet gotten their flu vaccines (I asked, because it’s an anecdotal indicator of how well they guessed on the seasonal flu strain). Although mortality-wise, as discussed in an update earlier this year, this appears to be a very typical flu season, it is a reminder that seasonal flu is not a good time if you catch it. Getting the annual flu vaccine is always a good idea (I got mine the morning of the day I was typing out this paragraph), particularly as flu season ramps up for the Northern hemisphere.
–Recent JAMA article showing increased risk of DM1 in kids who caught COVID in a retrospective study that controlled reasonably well got some internet hype.
For background, DM1, or diabetes mellitus type 1, is insulin dependent diabetes. It’s more common in kids, and occurs because the pancreas can no longer make enough insulin. Type 2 diabetes, the more adult form, is caused by insulin resistance, and thus is not insulin dependent at first. In type 2 diabetes, the body stops responding well to insulin, so the pancreas actually has to make way more than normal. That will eventually burn out insulin production in many type 2 diabetics, so some type 2 diabetes will wind up insulin dependent as well.
Type 1 diabetes is thought to be auto immune in origin. Viral infection, and there are a lot of viruses implicated, in some kids causes the immune system to accidentally attack and wipe out the cells that make insulin, causing type 1 diabetes mellitus. Respiratory viruses are commonly implicated. We mentioned before that there may be increased type 1 diabetes by a lot of anecdotal smoke following SARS-CoV-2 infection –probably no surprise as severe COVID is caused by over-reaction of the immune system to the virus. So studies have gone looking for more evidence of this. This is one such study.
This is a research letter, which is super short. You can access the entire thing here. More specifically, it’s a large retrospective cohort study, where they took a bunch of kids under 18 from 2020 through March 2021. All the ones who had a positive COVID-19 PCR test were put in the COVID cohort. The other cohort was about twice as large, and consisted of age and comorbidity matched kids who were positive for OTHER respiratory viruses in the same time period. The main finding is that, while still rare, diabetes mellitus type 1 was about twice as common in the COVID cohort than the “other respiratory viruses” cohort, and this was durable up to 6 months after a positive COVID test. What is not clear is if any of the kids in non-respiratory cohort later caught COVID, and if they developed type 1 DM at a higher rate as a result. What is also not clear is the effect, if any, of vaccination now that kids have subsequently got vaccinated. We should expect a similar cohort study looking at vaccination to presumably be protective against this increased risk of type 1 DM. That’s probably the authors’ next paper.
The main limitation, which the authors concede, is that this type of study can only demonstrate association for hypothesis generation. Clearly, COVID is associated with increased risk of type 1 DM in this cohort of patients. But, we don’t know if there was a severity association. One would guess there would likely be, with more severe COVID being high risk for type 1 DM, as anecdotes in adults have suggested. But since kids get severe COVID so rarely, and with that largely confined to kids with known comorbidities, some of those comorbidities may be confounding variables. Put another way, the true biological cause of Type 1 DM in this cohort could be SARS-CoV-2 alone; or it could be SARS-CoV-2 and one of these other potential, but untested, confounding variables; or it could be that the true cause increases the risk of Type 1 DM AND getting SARS-CoV-2, and SARS-CoV-2 is merely along for the ride. Correlation WITHOUT causation.
This is the challenge of cohort studies like this, which can only show correlation, but cannot prove causation.
That has been lost in some of the internet hoopla, most likely because it affects kids, and there are understandable emotions around that.
In my mind, next step is advancing the dates for the cohorts in this study (April 2021 through now), which will also capture the omicron waves, AND looking for a protective effect of the vaccine. If the vaccine is protective of Type 1 DM, it’s a little more evidence, although not definitive proof, that SARS-CoV-2 is a major biological cause.
To be clear, I think it more likely than not there is a slightly higher risk for Type 1 DM following severe COVID, because severe COVID is caused by the immune system going Ah-nold. And so is Type 1 DM. Entirely possible the pancreas cells making insulin are in the acre of forest Ah-nold and his immune system commandos level in severe COVID panic.
But, and this is key, Type 1 DM is still not very common in kids, even with SARS-CoV-2. You’re talking about 200 total cases out of over 300,000 kids counted in the “COVID” cohort. And that’s just the ones who hit a hospital or clinic to be counted in this study. The true denominator is likely higher than 300,000.
–Finally on the COVID science section, we had a reader submitted question about a nasal spray recently approved in Thailand that claims to prevent SARS-CoV-2 infection.
This is the Thai developed, approved and manufactured VIALL COVITRAP. I can only find descriptions of its mechanism of action in the media, and most of that is English language versions of Thailand news and near neighbor countries. From what I can gather, the spray works by coating the nasal passages with a substance designed to physically block the virus from contacting your cells, even if you manage to inhale some SARS-CoV-2. If it is what the media reports claim, it’s basically chemical snot, since the reason you make snot (and you do 24/7, 365 all along your respiratory tract) is for this exact reason. It’s a dense, gooey substance that provides a physical barrier for any bacteria, fungi or viruses that might be inhaled and try to wreak havoc on your respiratory cells.
So if your nasal passage, windpipe and lungs are the castle, think of snot as the “moat” and you’ll have the right idea. And this spray is designed to widen and deepen the moat.
It’s approved in Thailand only so far, and for use up to 3 times a day.
However, I cannot find any published reports on its effectiveness or clinical trials with it published in the usual international journals. This was developed in Thailand as a spin out from one of their universities and is approved via the Thai FDA. Presumably, there was data presented to the Thai FDA, so I’m sure some exists. I just can’t find any.
So while an interesting idea getting some heavy local Thailand media love, I have no idea how useful this spray is, or what the adverse effects and risks might be. I also don’t think you will find it on shelves outside of Thailand near term, unless they start submitting for approval in other countries.
And sorry. I looked. That’s really all I can find on this one…
Socioeconomic
–So the big news is very tangential to COVID, but does relate to a couple key points we have mentioned in this section before. I won’t go too deep on it, because I am not much of an expert here.
But the news of course is the sabotage of the Nordstream 1 and 2 pipelines in a not especially deep part of the Baltic Sea. This relates to COVID in a couple of ways.
First, the whodunit that has consumed much arm chair and media speculation reminds me an awful lot of the speculation over the “lab leak or completely natural” origin of COVID. The COVID origin became a major propaganda tug of war, and I stick by the conclusion that I think both explanations are very plausible and have some evidence, but will not know for sure for decades, if ever. Because again, that happened during an emerging Cold War between China and the US, and each had solid reason to tout their favored version.
Same story here.
There has been a lot of interesting and thought provoking analysis by people smarter than me starting with “cui bono?” and reasoning from there over who might be responsible for the Nordstream 1 and 2 sabotage.
Some combination of the US/NATO/Ukraine is blamed on the basis of an off the cuff remark President Biden made about how Nordstream 2 would never happen months ago (being way overinterpreted, since he was talking about the politics of its completion and operation, not actual sabotage), as well as how the US now makes Europe even more dependent on LNG shipments from the US. The most compelling argument for blaming the US, or other Western entity with a strong national interest in the Ukraine/Russia war, is that it “burns the ships” for Germany and the rest of the EU depending on natural gas from Russia through those pipelines. Europe is still very much in the early innings of its energy crisis, and if they got cold feet or societal unrest, might have been tempted to cut a realpolitik deal with Putin to get the gas turned back on. Blow up the pipelines, and now even if the war ends today, there is no way for the gas to go back on.
As a side note, most estimates from those who look credible to me online think months to up to a year or more to repair the damage are needed.
Regardless of who blew up what in the Baltic Sea, the effect is the same as all of those famous movie scenes, from “A Bronx Tale” and “Now youse can’t leave,” to “Kingsman: The Secret Service” and the “Manners maketh man” speech. The bar doors have now been locked, to the surprise of at least some of the parties in the bar, who now find themselves committed to a bar brawl with no way to exit.
Similarly, there is no easy retreat for Europe now.
Ergo, the arguments online state, not only does the West have the capability, those in the West trying to ensure support for Ukraine in the Ukraine/Russia war are those cui bono–along with the US oil and natural gas companies, as Europe becomes more dependent on them. Besides, their argument continues, why would Putin blow up pipelines that his economy largely depends on? Taking out the only infrastructure that lets him supply to his biggest customer is nuts.
The problem with that argument is that even if Europe goes wobbly over the winter and cuts support to the Ukraine, Putin has already shown himself, conclusively, to be an unreliable energy source. On the ground, right now, Ukraine is kicking ass and taking names–in fact, forcing a deeply unpopular conscription in Russia as Putin looks to be attempting the classic Russian strategy of sacrificing as many lives as necessary to attrition its way to “victory.” Europe can, is and will continue to diversify from dependence on Russia. That will take time, sure, but it will happen over this decade. Burning the ships by blowing up Nordstream 1 and 2 really buys you European “resolve” for this winter, and probably the next 2-3 tops. But at an awful risk of completely destroying the relationship among allies–when it’s not immediately obvious that you need to take that risk right now if you are the US or other NATO party.
It’s also very difficult to see how the Biden administration, and other Western governments, who have been restricting new oil and gas exploration, threatening their domestic companies with windfall taxes, and demanding new supply while at the same time demanding that their countries move away from the need for those products, are suddenly blowing up international pipelines to benefit the very businesses they are pillorying as unpatriotic price gougers intent on destroying the globe via the climate change their products only hasten.
Thus, it’s also absolutely possible for Russia to have been behind this. “They wouldn’t blow up their own infrastructure–it would economically wreak them! It’s not a rational act!” is the main argument against the Russians being responsible.
Well, so would invading Ukraine, and Putin went ahead and did that anyways. Putin’s war mobilization speech in the last couple weeks is worth reading, because it lays out his causus belli, as he sees it, for his actions in the Ukraine and beyond. He, no joke, sees himself and Russia in a war of civilizations between the West and Russia. He makes some fair points about the poor quality of leadership in the West, but the rest is simply unhinged. My personal favorite was his claim that Russia was a leader in the “anti-colonial” movement of WW2 and has never acted aggressively to expand its borders or impose its will by force on other nations, as he claims the “Satanist” (direct quote) West routinely does.
Anyone else remember how Russia got involved in WW2? You know, that whole little episode where Stalin cut a deal with Hitler to divide Poland between them, and then they both simultaneously sneak attacked the Poles? To say nothing of the Afghan invasion by the Soviets, or why every Eastern European country has turned around and asked to be part of NATO the second they could after the Soviet Union imploded. Curious why so many would run from saintly Russia’s anti-colonialism to the colonist West so quickly…
But I digress.
Suffice to say, Putin views himself in a hot war with Ukraine that is part of a broader, albeit still indirect, war with the US and NATO. He was willing to blow up his own economy via the promised sanctions if he invaded Ukraine. The Ukrainians have unexpectedly mauled him on the ground, to the point that if war goes hot with NATO, I do not favor Russia’s chances. I doubt Putin does either. But war is politics by other means, and if Putin can wreck the Europeans economically by making Nordstream 1 and 2 unoperational, well, to him, it’s a war of civilizations and that is probably fair play in his eyes.
Nordstream 1 and 2 will be unoperational even if he is personally removed. Coup, assassination, whatever. Whomever might replace Vlad as head of Russia cannot now flip the switch and restore flow through Nordstream 1. In Vlad’s personal risk:benefit, this may remove some benefit of taking him off the table. Thus making coup, assassination etc. less likely. In a way, it may have burned some of the ships for actors inside the Kremlin and Russia–it impairs a significant chip they would have brought to the negotiating table if their plan was to take Putin out as a road to an honorable withdrawal from a dishonorable war. With this sabotage in the Baltic Sea, whomever might replace Vlad cannot go to the negotiating table from a position of strength. Not while they are losing on the ground in the Ukraine, and not while whomever replaces him cannot turn the gas back on as an act of good faith for easier terms of peace. Considering how many Gazprom executives, and their families, have met increasingly improbable ends since the war started, all I’m saying is that is absolutely possible that the personal benefit of Putin and those most dependent on him inside Russia may have trumped national benefit in deciding to blow up some of their own essential infrastructure. And Putin and those who depend on him to still be in power in Russia absolutely have the capability in the Baltic Sea to have done this as well. Victory or death, comrades?
Secondly, even though it damages Russia’s economy, recall they have been surviving already on little to no gas, and clearly recognize that little to no gas will flow through those pipelines so long as they are invading Ukraine and Western resolve is maintain sanctions to stop that. They may not view it as quite as large a loss as others assume they do–especially if they think the repairs might be done before the war is over. And that gas won’t flow until the war is over regardless of its functional status, in some Russian calculations.
Also recall that Putin views this conflict as a clash of civilizations, complete with religious overtones, between Russia and the West. He believes that Russia is bravely and courageously leading a coalition of countries tired of being exploited by the corrupt and venal Western oligarchy. We said in a previous post that the short version plan to win a war is to first erode your enemy’s will and ability to fight. In modern terms, that is causing their citizens to fight amongst themselves, or at least refuse to fight for their leadership, eroding morale, followed by destroying their economy, which provides the ability to fight a modern war with expensive modern equipment. It costs a lot to keep soldiers trained, armed, healthy, and supplied in the field. Only after you have damaged the will and ability of the enemy to fight do you fight them. Or as Sun Tzu put it in “The Art of War,” first defeat your enemy, and only then do you fight him.
In fact, ideally, you have destroyed their will and ability to fight before fighting them–thus achieving what Sun Tzu called the highest achievement in his “Art of War”, to win without fighting at all.
So look at what the Nordstream 1 and 2 sabotage do, for Russia, in that light. They place tremendous strain on the European economy, which, due to shortages just from the gas not flowing at nearly the same rate through those pipelines already, has seen major industries cut back or shutter. This reduces the ability of the European members of NATO to improve their own armies and supply them, let alone continue to provide ammunition and weapons to the Ukrainians. On top of that, you have seen upset elections already in Europe over the economic damage being done on the content. For example, the new Italian prime minister, whose election the head of the EU said might bring “consequences” down on Italy for electing someone who is… perhaps not as attached to the European Union vision as prior Italian leaders. I am also sure there is no small number of Europeans who believe that the US might have bombed Nordstream 1 and 2, a wedge which might cause the European will continue to support the US, NATO and/or the Ukrainian war to falter.
As a second level, you increase rancor within the Western alliance you are engaged in civilizational conflict with. You also force the US to divert LNG from its own use to try and supply its allies in Europe. This will put to the question the ability of the US to maintain its domestic energy needs, while meeting at least enough of Europe’s, all while maintaining the ability of the US military to fight and win wars on two fronts, as has guided US military planning since WW2. The US may also be forced to take on more of the burden of supplying weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, which is already a contentious topic politically, in the midst of a mid-term election. Some within the US are also openly speculating if the US was the culprit, again causing discord among the citizens of your enemy (again, from Russia’s perspective), doing at least some damage to the will to fight.
So yes, blowing the pipelines if you are Russia damages some of your infrastructure. But it also damages the will and ability of European NATO to fight you, and at a second level, also damages or at least strains the will and ability of the US to fight you as well. With definite near term effects on the ability of the NATO alliance to continue to supply Ukraine.
Are all of those also reasons for the Russians to be the ones cui bono by the Nordstream bombings? I think so. Compelling enough to make rational what would seem irrational, bombing “their own” infrastructure under the Baltic Sea? Yeah, I think there are reasons to do that which the Russians would find rational, both personal for Putin as well as in their national interest if they believe in Putin’s clash of civilizations casus belli.
Lastly, the Baltic Sea is heavily patrolled between the NATO countries and the northern Russian fleet. That someone could get to Nordstream 1 and 2, with a clear, well-executed operation to blow them both, and NOT get spotted by the forces of either belligerent is the most interesting part to me.
Interesting in a very disturbing way. That kind of security lapse is embarrassing for at least one of those parties–and both if it was instead some other third party who is truly responsible.
Which, not impossible it’s someone we haven’t really thought of. If there were ever a real life Bond villain, for example, this operation is basically ripped from the script, is it not? Or take some radical environmental faction. If you were committed to stopping use of natural gas and oil for power to protect the climate, and had the ability to bomb Nordstream 1 and 2, you might be radical enough to do that. There certainly have been serious criminal vandalism acts in the name of the planet before.
Or next level, if you wanted to discredit some of those organizations, you could bomb Nordstream 1 and 2 and try to set up the nation or environmental movement you wanted to take the fall for it. Paint them as a dangerous rogue, and get them cast out as an international pariah for the damage they will have wrought to Europe by the end of the winter…
–So avoid the temptation to speculate too hard. We just don’t know. The only ones who know for sure who the culprit is are the ones who actually did it. There are plausible motives and opportunities for nearly every side suggested as a suspect. And with the propaganda flying as fast as bullets, we won’t know the truth for decades, if in our lifetimes at all. Just like COVID origins.
And also just like COVID origins, figuring out whodunit does not immediately repair the damage to Nordstream 1 and 2.
That damage is the bigger problem.
–So coming back to how this bombing presents relates to another major theme is the inevitable supply chain shock this will present.
Europe is fuct. Or rekt. Or whatever internet patois you prefer.
Now, I know what you are going to say, Bloomberg Terminal Owning Hypothetical Reader. “Europe has stored an almost record level of natural gas for the winter, expecting this shortage, and at heavy cost. In fact, prices for gas and electricity are now starting to fall as their need to buy at any price tapers off.”
This is true. At this precise moment in time.
However, even if the storage is sufficient, and the weather co-operates, to get through the winter without collapsing European industries even more than it already has… Even if storage is sufficient to keep the growing “burn your energy bills” protests around the continent from becoming widespread, Iran-like revolts… Europe is still screwed.
They cannot import and transit LNG and oil at the same rate through their available port facilities as they could through Nordstream 1 and 2. As they draw off storage this winter, they will not be able to replenish that supply at the same rate. Expanding that infrastructure will take years. They have a present stored supply that will last months.
By March of 2023, prices will again be high, and you will see more than just hypotheticals about European countries considering no longer supplying energy for their neighbors out of their stored supplies. Because those storages tanks are going to be looking disturbingly low.
Spring is the historical starving season, let’s not forget.
Even as Europe now scrambles, too late, in the recognition that it made itself far too dependent on cheap and predictable Russian gas and oil, and moves to find alternative energy sources, they will not come online quickly enough. They will still have to ship in the LNG and oil for the foreseeable future and quite possibly even if Nordstream is repaired by next spring (the war with Ukraine seems likely to still be continuing then). That’s more expensive, as they are competing with Asia for those boats. Bangledesh’s national power grid went out this week, as I am sure you saw in headlines. Part of the reason is that Bangledesh was getting priced out of available energy to run its power plants by European demand these last several months. Now that Nordstream sabotage showed that infrastructure is fair game to at least someone, the risk of “accidents” in transit for those LNG and oil tankers is now higher too. That will be reflected in shipping costs. Price caps suggested by the G7 are already, this week, being met by OPEC taking its ball and leaving by cutting up to 2 million barrels per day of production to keep price levels high. As I write this, the White House is big mad, calling that a hostile move, and doubling down on all the things that have not worked so far, like domestic oil company intimidation, promised investment in US alternative energy sources, and more releases from the already historically low strategic petroleum reserve. And now announcing talks with Venezuela, whose leadership, similar to Saudi Arabia, we were just recently calling an oppressive dictator and international pariah.
OPEC kerfluffle is a shame really. I had much higher hopes for the relationship after Biden fist bumped the Saudi Crown Prince…
Bro love aside though, the OPEC nations need oil at a certain level to afford food, as the post pandemic inflationary impulse we have covered a lot continues to keep the world at large at food insecurity risk. They appear reluctant to starve and/or risk Arab Springs again for the sake of the European economy or the Ukrainians. So regions that have to import their energy, like Asia and Europe, are going to have to pay the producer’s price.
How does this rhyme with COVID? Well, again, historically, rampant and serious inflation follows pandemics. The records tell us this happened in the Black Death, despite a massive deflationary “demand” shock from the loss of 30% of the population.
So you have a multi-fold problem from energy supply issues in Europe, that already impact Asia at a minimum, and will continue to reverberate around the world. Recall as we have discussed that the global world trade system, the linchpin of our civilization at this point in time, requires a certain amount of energy, predictable in availability, delivery, and at a roughly predictable price. You have significant uncertainty in the amount of energy available, its ability to deliver on time to meet demand, and at a predictable price. As we can expect, that has global economic impact. Already European industries have had to shut down or scale back. Bangledesh is a major cog in the clothing industry for the world, and a large chunk of it is still offline because there is no power to run the factories. A major Netherlands canned food supplier is temporarily halting operations as of this week due to spiraling energy costs and inflation.
So once more, even if they get through the winter, there is no way to restore the same supply of energy to Europe, even by shipping LNG, that they got from Nordstream 1. Getting more LNG drilled, getting more LNG capable ports and transit built, getting alternative supplies that work reliably (like nuclear) built, will all take time. Already, some energy companies in Europe are suggesting that the real energy crunch for the continent will not be this winter, but winter of 2023-2024. Meanwhile, supplies will be critical no matter what by the end of the winter. And then what for Europe? Then what for Asia?
Continued inflation, eating what discretionary income remains, for both Europe and many other nations around the world that will also need to import oil and LNG. For just the European second order effects of that, it means less stuff imported into Europe from China and elsewhere, a major demand side shock this time to the global economy. At the same time that those Asian producers are having to pay higher food and fuel costs themselves. It is a real risk of global stagflation.
Further, you are guaranteed to be missing widgets again, because Europe absolutely is the only or major global supplier of some of them. Same for places in Asia like Bangledesh. The bullwhip effect that we saw in the pandemic in supply chains, and reverberating today, are going to continue for the foreseeable future. For example, freight prices for trucks and ships have absolutely collapsed, as retailers like Nike (just this week) are taking write downs from having too MUCH inventory this year, having ordered as much as they could, when they could, uncertain of when it might actually arrive. Meanwhile, with food and fuel inflation, people have been putting off buying a new pair of sneaks. This means they are ordering less, so less need for trucks and ships for manufacturing orders that are not getting made. For now. Until the bullwhip hits, and Nike has sold down their existing stock of shoes only to discover that widgets are now missing from Europe and getting inventory restocked, let alone on time, is suddenly their biggest problem again.
There is a non-zero, and with Nordstream 1 down, I would argue growing chance of a -major- economic crisis starting this winter and roiling through next year prompted by all of this.
Yes, these types of events are generally seen before major shooting wars too, so the non-zero chance of that is growing too.
If you are one of our European readers, you need to lay away a lot of canned food -now- and have a way to supply your own energy needs. Availability, at any price, is a not a guarantee for you. Hedge your downside risks.
Those of you on the African continent may also want to consider the same, if your particular country is a net energy importer and/or cannot meet its own food requirements without imports. Inflationary pressure on wages everywhere may also lead to social unrest. Be prepared for that as well.
–If you are one of our North American readers, the first thing you should do, right here and now, is quietly and sincerely thank God that you are one of the luckiest bastards to every walk the planet, gifted to live on a continent with vast natural resources (including rare earths, uranium and oil) governed by three admittedly imperfect but largely stable countries at little risk of shooting each other. There are deep capital resources, and all three are exporters of food and energy. The continent enjoys the longest interconnected internal waterway system in the world, making transport of those goods it produces from the interior to the coasts for export cheap and efficient.
Any idiot can be a superpower here. As America has clearly proven ; )
The only thing that can stop North America is themselves.
This continent is the last bastion of resilience in a world facing significant challenges this decade.
So now that you are done blessing your tremendous luck, here’s the second thing I need you to do.
I need you to realize that destiny is calling. As loath as they may be to admit it, the world will need the Eagle this decade. And the world will need the Maple Leaf and the Tricolor too. The blessings of this continent are the reserves of food and fuel that will be in such desperate need elsewhere. As long as we don’t completely blow it.
Which means, my fellow American readers, we have the moral obligation to get it together. The schismogenesis must stop. We must find the middle ground.
I realize some of you will likely read that, and agree, thinking that it is high time that the extremist other tribe realizes the error of their ways and falls completely in line with the Truth you have known for so long now.
Yeah, stop that.
We must find the middle ground. The isolation of lockdowns, of remote work, of the easy of just grabbing a device and disappearing on the content personalized for you, to seize your attention. The gravity of schismogenesis. All these things are static. A steady white noise around us, that has kept us from listening to each other, even as we drift further apart.
We all know, both tribes, that it feels wrong and is going wrong. Things, all things, seem to slip away, and in steady danger of getting worse. Hell, this section has been a lot of doom, yet again. We all want it to be better, and at the highest level, we agree on what that better is. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. We only quibble about what those mean to us, and how to best ensure them.
There is common ground if we can stay out of the minutiae and listen. Start by finding something you agree about with members of the other tribe, and build from there.
We need to be pragmatic to rise to the challenge of producing enough energy and food for ourselves, and enough that we can provide for others around the world in need. We need to hear what the world is saying about the way things have been run and structured. We need to listen to the bonfire of credibilities, refine the gold and remove the dross.
And to do that, we need to shake the malaise and the shock of crises that seem to just keep coming in waves. We must get it together. If I need to link the “game of inches” speech, I’ll do that here. I think you can make every word of it into the appropriate allegory.
With charity to all, with malice towards none, to paraphrase a former leader. Crisis calls for courage and character, and we will show our national courage and our character through this long crisis. If you want America to be the nation it could be in your eyes, this decade will be your chance.
But first, we need to heal, as a team, now, or we will die as individuals.
To paraphrase another.
–Don’t count on the current crop of politicians though. Any of them, really. On this, we will need to lead our “leaders.”
–Your thought pieces this week:
- This is a fantastic, and easily understandable, read about risks in the financial world that may be starting to surface as pandemic responses to the economics of the lock down strategy continue to reverberate in unexpected ways. Catalyst, though, not underlying cause. Read it. You’ll see.
“Effective listening is about 1) carefully paying attention . . . 2) using wise discernment before responding, and 3) following through with active, right responses.
Hearing involves understanding and acting.”
–Someone smarter and wiser than me.
3. Some ancient poetry: Psalm 46.
Your chances of catching coronavirus or monkeypox are equivalent to the chances of the Detroit Lions turning the decades long franchise losing streak around this season. There are definite signs, so it’s certainly still possible, but the odds continue to dwindle based on accumulating evidence.
<Paladin>